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1. Background
In recent years there has been growing concern that the safety of our roads, particularly the
national highways, has been deteriorating. This is purported to be partly related to the
unsafe on-road behaviour of long distance truck drivers. In Australia, this view was
influenced by the marked increase in fatal crashes involving semi-trailers in 1988 and by a
particularly severe crash between a semi-trailer and a coach which claimed the lives of 20
people and injured 18 passengers in October 1989. In 1988, there were 151 fatalities in New
South Wales resulting from crashes involving semi-trailers. This was twice the number in
1987. The high rate of fatalities continued in 1989 with 143 people killed in crashes
involving semi-trailers.
The media attention given to crashes involving long distance heavy vehicles has helped
create a negative image of the long distance truck driver and the trucking industry as a
whole. The negative image of truck drivers has evolved with little, if any, questioning of the
reasons behind that behaviour. We do not believe that it is reasonable to assume that all
operators in the industry are irresponsible "cowboys", who spend long hours speeding along
the highways without thought for their own or other road users’ safety. Indeed, analysis of
crash statistics shows that the incidence of heavy vehicle crashes relative to exposure on the
road is very small and represents an impressive safety record (Hensh r et al. 1991).
Theories and anecdotes about the causes of unsafe on-road behaviour of heavy vehicle
drivers abound. But there is a dearth of substantive studies directed towards an enquiry into
the causes of particular on-road beh viour and hence levels of exposure to risk of a crash.
The study reported here evolved out of a concern that there is a lack of systematic scientific
evidence, especially in relation to the links between the underlying economic structure of the
industry and on-road performance (Savage 1989, Sweatman et al. 1990). Without better
evidence, we run the risk of regulatory authorities proposing inappropriate strategies to
modify the on-road behaviour of the long distance trucking industry in order to improve the
safety of the road environment. Often “band-aid” policies are introduced in response to a
particular incident receiving public attention. For example immediately following the
October 1989 truck and coach crash on the Pacific Highway, the speed limit for heavy
vehicles was reduced from 100 km per hour to 90 km per hour.
This study explores the possibility of links between the propensity of a driver to speed and
the economic conditions in the industry in general and the driver’s own particular
economic operating environment. We concentrate on speed and fatigue as indicators of
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exposure to risk. These factors were found to be major contributors to crashes in a study
of all heavy vehicle crashes in NSW in 1988 (Sweatman et al. 1990). Given that there are a
number of complex inter-relationships which contribute to the ultimate on-road
performance of truck drivers (H nsher and Battellino 1990), the separation of the major
sources of influence can only satisfactorily be achieved by a formal quantitative
investigation using suitable econometric techniques. The interactions between the major
elements of the study are summarised schematically in Figure 1. The critical dimensions
which require explanation are the economic rewards (annual income net of expenses), the
overall number of hours of work required to return an acceptable income, the number of
productive driving hours, the incidence of speeding, the extent of fines for speeding in
particular and its links with economic return, the incidence of pill taking and self-
imposition of schedules and its linkage with on-road performance with respect to sources
of exposure to risk.
Data was collected from an indepth face to face interview of 800 long distance truck
drivers throughout Australia. A key aspect of the survey was obtaining data on a recent
trip undertaken by each driver. Descriptive analysis of the sample data is reported fully in
Hensher et al. (1991) and summarised in Hensher et al. 1992 and the Appendix. The
richness of the information from the survey available to draw on for the econometric
analysis is summarised in Table 1.
The paper is organised as follows. The causal structures of the behavioural model systems
associated with the annual economic reward profile and the trip-specific exposure to risk
are presented, followed by the empirical results and interpretation for each of the model
systems. A summary of the major findings is given in the conclusion.
2. The Causal Hypotheses
It is hypothesised that a truck driver is motivated by economic reward and seeks to obtain a
return for his efforts through participation either as an owner driver or employee driver.
The decision on whether to be an employee or to be self-employed is in part influenced by
the opportunities for reward, the flexibility of lifestyle and the extent of a real choice (i.e.
the availability of employment in the employee driver sector). Given the highly competitive
“cut-throat” nature of the long distance trucking industry, drivers exhibit substantial
variations in strategic behaviour in order to survive. The pressures on drivers come from
freight forwarders, cargo owners, and the large number of operators competing for loads.
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Figure 1 Major elements of the study
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The lifestyle element of trucking, especially for owner drivers and small company
employees, has reinforced the acceptability of working practices which in other industries
would be regarded as totally unacceptable. Typically, many drivers spend considerable time
waiting for an opportunity to secure a load, they rarely sleep at their “permanent
residence”, spend considerable hours in the cabin of their truck, and live on a “junk-food”
diet (AUSTROADS 1991). Reliance on “stay-awake” pills is quite widespread (46% of
sampled drivers take pills on some trips or all the time) in order to maintain very long
working hours, typically averaging 100 hours per week (H nsh r et al. 1992). Self-imposed
schedules which may encourage excess speed are often the outcome of the pressures on
truckies, especially owner drivers.
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Table 1 Potential sources of influence on economic reward and the propensity to
speed
1. On-Road Profile
Total kilometres (TS)
Total time (TS)
Total number of legs (TS)
Incidence of drive time per leg (TS) *
Variance of drive time incidence per leg (TS)
*
Speed profile of trip (TS) *
Average speed per leg (TS) *
Speed variance across legs (TS) *
No. of stops involving particular activities
(sleep, rest, eat, etc.) (TS) *
2. Trip Timing
Depart during the weekend (TS) *
Depart early morning (TS)
Depart during the day (TS)
Depart during the evening (TS) *
No. and % of hours driving in the dark (TS) *
3. Pressures on Performance
External schedule constraints (TS) *
Self-imposed schedules (TS) *
Loan repayments *
4. The Road Environment
Specific-roads (quality proxy) (TS)
Direction of travel on a specific road (TS)
Major origin-destination pairs (TS) *
Frequency of trips on major routes *
5. Vehicle Characteristics
Body type (rigid, articulated) (TS) *
Age (TS)
Weight (TS) *
6. Cargo Characteristics
Weight (TS)
General cargo (TS)
Perishable cargo (TS) *
Express freight (TS)
Specialised cargo (TS)
7. Safety and Security Control
Speed limiter installed (TS)
Tachograph on board (TS)
Incidence of fines (speeding, log book, truck
defaults, overloading) *
8. Driver Background
Age *
Number of dependants (children)
Prior occupation *
Undertaken a training course
Number of crashes in previous 2 years
9. Industry Experience
Years driving
Annual kilometres
Annual working hours *
Annual driving hours *
Number of trucks possessed *
10. Lifestyle Attributes
Reliance on pills (always, some trips) *
Means of maintaining alertness en route
Activities in 8 hours prior to departure (TS) *
11. Preferential Treatment
Regular contracts (for all, some, no loads) *
Access to load (TS)
Backload provisions *
12. Sub-Industry Status
Employee driver (small, medium, large co.) *
Owner driver fleet owner *
Owner driver prime contractor *
Owner driver independent sub-contractor *
Independent owner driver *
13. Economic Reward Determination
Owner driver (c/km) (TS) *
Employee driver - fixed salary, % of truck
earnings, per trip *
14. Structural Constraints
Backload available (TS) *
Unloading time (TS)
Waiting to unload (TS)
Time to usually secure loads *
15. Financial Status
Annual truck-related income
Annual truck-related expenses (OD) *
Non-truck related income
Truck financial commitments *
16. Other Dimensions
State location of base *
* = included in the model system
TS = data specific to one trip
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The challenge in this study is to establish the links between good and bad practice, positive
and negative incentives and the two key concerns of economic reward and on-road
performance in the context of exposure to risk. The evidence can be used to establish some
guidelines for changes to be encouraged in the industry which will improve the working
environment in a way that both enhances the economic rewards of drivers and their on-road
performance.
With these objectives in mind, two causal structures (summarised in Figure 2) are
proposed:
(i) Model system I - MSI: the annual economic reward profile, and
(ii) Model system II - MSII: the trip-specific exposure to risk.
Figure 2 The causal structure of the two model systems
Model system I: Annual economic reward profile
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MSI hypothesises that total working hours are influenced by a number of exogenous factors
representing the sixteen generic categories of potential influences (Table 1). These factors
are used to explain behaviour. Total working hours determine, with other exogenous
variables, the proportion of work hours that involve time behind the wheel; and the
incidence of wheel hours together with a number of exogenous effects, determine the
average weekly earnings of drivers (net of truck-related expenses for owner drivers).
MSII hypothesises that on-road performance as measured by average speed per trip leg
and/or the standard deviation of the average trip leg speeds is influenced by a number of
exogenous variables and two end genous  effects - the propensity to take pills and the
propensity to adopt self-imposed schedules. Schedules imposed by a company or freight
forwarder are exogenously determined and hence are treated as given constraints on
behaviour. This influence is hypothesised to operate in one of two possible ways: (i) the
propensity to have a self-imposed schedule influences the propensity to use pills which in
turn has an effect on the average speed per leg (and the standard deviation across legs) and
(ii) the propensity to take pills and to self-impose a schedule jointly influence the on-road
speed profile.
One of the important features of the study is the link between on-road performance and
economic reward. The link is achieved via information on the actual rate received for each
trip. For owner drivers this represents money earned by the driver, however for an
employee driver this represents the earnings of the employer. We were unable to identify
the actual earnings for the trip attributable to an employee driver; our empirical analysis
makes a distinction between the earnings of the owner driver and the earnings of the
employer. This enables us to evaluate the role of the freight rate on on-road performance
which in the case of an owner driver is also the economic reward. Since each trip’s rate or
fee is negotiated in a number of dimensions (per load, per tonne, per km) all trip rates were
converted to an equivalent rate per kilom tre.
Since 7% of owner drivers and 65% of employee drivers did not know the rates, the
modelling presents two sets of empirical results: one for the full sample (791 trips excluding
fleet operator owner drivers and a few unreliable observations) and one for the trips where
the rates are known (410). The decision to present two sets of results was taken to preserve
the richness of the full sample in respect of the role of variables other than trip rates.
However given the importance of trip rates in providing the trip-specific link between
overall economic reward and on-road performance, the smaller sample was analysed. The
larger sample was used to identify the set of influences on on-road performance which were
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included in the reduced-sample model together with separate trip rate variables for owner
drivers and employee drivers.
3. Model Specification
3.1 Model system I - Annual Economic Reward Profile
This model has five endogenous variables:
1. Average weekly earnings net of truck expenses (INCPWKN)
2. Incidence of driving time in total work hours (DRVHRS)
3. Total work hours (WORKHRS)
4. Number of speeding fines in the last 12 months (FINES)
5. Number of log book fines in the last 12 months (FINEL)
With WORKHRS and DRVHRS  appearing on the right-hand side of four of the equations
(Figure 2), a system of simultaneous equations is estimated using three stage least squares
(3SLS) (Greene 1990).
3SLS recognises, and allows for, the non-independence of the error structures of each of
the equations. The left-hand side (LHS) variable in a single equation is a function of a set
of exogenous variables and a set of unobserved effects, the latter generically represented
by the error or disturbance term. When the endogenous variable is introduced into a
second equation as a right-hand side variable, it is likely that the error term of the first
equation will be correlated with the error term of the second equation since they
potentially measure a number of common influences on both endogenous variables. Failure
to recognise this possibility and to allow for it can result in biased parameter estimates of
the RHS variables. This becomes a source of misleading inference as to the role of RHS
variables in explaining variations in the magnitude of the RHS variable.
3.2 Model system II - Trip-Specific Exposure to Risk
The endogenous variables in MSII are a mixture of continuous and discrete variables.
Techniques such as OLS and 3SLS are not appropriate when a dependent variable is
discrete (Hensher and Johnson 1981, Greene 1990). When an endogenous RHS variable is
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discrete, we need to consider the phenomenon of sample selection (or selectivity) which
represents the idea of partial inference with respect to each sampled individual’s behaviour.
Think of the situation of a driver who is currently taking pills. We observe how this habit
affects his driving speed. We do not observe how his driving speed is affected if he did not
take pills. Conversely we observe the driving behaviour of a person not on pills, but not his
behaviour if he were to take pills. Since the choice of taking pills is an endogenous choice
(i.e. the individual chooses himself), the inability to observe each driver’s b haviour in the
absence/presence of pills given their current status means that we have potential sample
selectivity bias (due to self-selection). Because we have a sub-sample of pill takers and a
sub-sample of non-pill takers, we can combine the two samples and use the endogenous
dummy variable PILLS together with an auxiliary regressor to test for the effect of any
likely selectivity bias due to the absence of such information. If the non-pill takers have
characteristics similar to the pill takers which influence their propensity to speed after
allowing for sources of influence on the choice between taking or not taking pills, then we
would expect to reject the hypothesis of selectivity bias.
Formally, we begin by assuming that the sample of pill taking and non-pill taking drivers
are drawn from a single population of long distance drivers. For the ith driv r, (i = 1,...,d
...D), let yi be the on-road measure of performance (average speed); zi the pill taking
variable (1 = takes pills, 0 = do not take pills); wi the unobserved “lifestyle” and
“pressures”; x1i  the exogenous vector of k background variables (including the constant);
x2i the exogenous vector of m background variables, where x1i  is a subset of x2i ; and z*
is the unobserved continuous variable determining pill taking. The model system which
recognises the relationships between these elements is:
(1)   y i = wi + azi + eoi
(2)   wi = x1i
¢  b1 + e1i
(3)   z
i
 = x
2i
¢  b2 + u2i
(4)  
zi = 1 if zi
* >0
zi = 0 if zi
* £0
Substituting equation (2) into (1) gives equation (5):
(5)   y
i
 = x
1i
¢  b1 + azi + u1i  
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where u1i  = e0i  + e1i . It is assumed that u2i  is normally distributed and E( u1i | u2i ) is a
linear function of u2i  such that:
E( u1i ) = E( u2i ) = 0
var( u1i ) = s1
2
var( u2i ) = 1
cov (u 1i , u2i  ) = rs1
cov (u 1i , u1j  ) = cov (u 1i , u2j  ) = 0 of i ¹j
u
2i  is constrained to have unit variance without any loss of generality. Let us now define
q = - x
2i
¢
 b2. Barnow et al. (1981) have shown that:
(6)  E( u2i |q,z i) = zi f( q i)/(1 - F( q i)) - (1- zi) f( q i)/F( q i)
= h
i
(q i)  or h i
where ƒ( . ) and F( . ) define the standard normal density and the cumulative distribution
functions. It follows that:
(7)  E( u
1i
|q i,z i) = rs1h i
The application of OLS to equation (7) will produce unbiased estimates of a and b1 only i
rs1h1 = 0  . This condition can be satisfied if one or more of the following requirements are
met:
a. Equation (3) predicts pill taking choice without error ( u2i = 0   for all drivers).
b. Drivers are randomly assigned to pill taking and non-pill taking categories (i.e.
 var ( u1i )¹0, var( u2i )¹0, cov( wi, zi*) = 0 and thus cov ( u1i , u2i ) = 0 ).
c. Although lifestyle, industry pressures and pill taking choice are correlated in the driver
population [ cov( wi , zi* ) ¹ 0], there is no correlation between lifestyle/industry pressures
and pill taking choice after conditioning on observed X2
[cov( wi, zi* |x2 ) = cov ( u1i , u2i ) = 0   for all drivers].
Requirement (a) is unlikely to be met. Requirements (b) and (c) need to be tested. We
cannot impose the assumption that (b) or (c) is satisfied. Given the single-population
assumption, if we can assume that the values of ß1 ar  independent of pill taking choice,
then consistent estimates of parameters can be derived as follows:
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Implement a pill taking choice model of the binary pro t form using maximum likelihood
to obtain parameter estimates for ß2:
(8)   Pr [ z
i
 = 1 ] = F ( x
2i
¢  b2)
Given the estimator  ß2, calculate a parameter index
(9)   q i = - x2i
¢  b2
and define the auxiliary or selectivity regressor:
(10)  h i = zi f( q i)/(1 - F( q i)) - (1- zi) f( q i)/F( q i)
Then include this selectivity term in equation (5), denoting the unknown scaling or
parameter of rs1 as c, to obtain the selectivity regression:
(11)   y
i
 = x
1i
¢  b1 + azi + c h i + hi
The parameter estimates in (11) are consistent when OLS is used; however a correction is
required to allow for heteroscedastic errors wi and hi unless r = 0 . The correction is
implemented in this study to ensure that the standard errors of the OLS model are correct
(Greene 1981).
The approach can be extended to more than one endogenous dummy variable and
alternative assumptions on the distributions of the unobserved effects in the discrete choice
model. In the current context we want to investigate pill consumption and self-imposed
schedules, both being observed as discrete binary variates. However, there are two
reasonable structural relationships between schedules and drugs:
(i) The first assumes that pill taking and the self-imposition of a schedule are joint
(correlated) determinants of the propensity to speed. A bivariate probit model (using
starting values from individual binary probit models) is estimated to produce two
selectivity regressors.
(ii) The second assumes that the probability of pill taking is conditional on whether a
driver has a self-imposed schedule, and that pill taking then directly influences the
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propensity to speed. A nested logit model is estimated. First the choice of a self-
imposed schedule is modelled as a binary logit specification. The probability outcomes
are used to construct an index which represents the expected maximum utility (EMU)
associated with the self-imposition of a schedule conditioning the probability of pill
taking. The pill taking lo it model is then estimated with the EMU index included as a
RHS variable. If the parameter estimate of EMU is not statistically significantly
different from unity, then the choice of a self-imposed schedule and pill taking is a
joint determination (Hensher 1986). The selectivity term derived from the pill taking
model takes a different form to that in the first specification although it has the same
interpretation. This arises because the unobserved effects in the logit model have an
extreme value type I distribution.
To understand the logit approach as a representation of an alternative behavioural
hypothesis, let us consider the case of any number of alternative outcomes. It is a
reasonable behavioural hypothesis that truckies act to maximise utility (V), and that they
constantly evaluate alternative ways of achieving outcomes (s) consistent with this
behavioural postulate. An alternative outcome is chosen if and only if it provides the
highest (indirect) utility, that is if:
(12)  Vs >max Vj , j = 1, ..., M; j ¹s
The probability that alternative s will be chosen is given by:
(13) P s = prob  (Vs>max V j "jÎM; j ¹s)
Let us define:
(14) hs = max Vj  - ms , j = 1, ..., M; j ¹s
The alternative s is chosen if and only if bs
¢
 X s > hs. The unobserved effects are assumed to
be independently and identically distributed extreme value type I. It can be shown that
given a vector of exogenous variables, X, the distribution of  F ( hs)  f hs is:
(15)   F (hs) = exp (hs) / [  exp (hs) + expSM
j=1
j¹s
 (bj
¢)  X ]
and the probability that the alternative s will be chosen is:
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(16) P s =
exp (bs
¢X)
exp (bj
¢X)S
j=1
M
This is the familiar multinomial logit model (McFadden 1981, Hensher and Johnson 1981,
Greene 1990). To derive the selectivity regressor, let F denote the standard normal
distribution function. The transformation J = F
-1
 F   proposed by Lee (1983) is strictly
increasing, and the transformed random variable hs
*
 where hs 
* = J( hs) will be a standard
normal variate. Since J is a strictly increasing transformation, the alternative s is chosen if,
and only if J ( bs
¢
 X) > hs
*
. Since both the random variables es and hs 
*
 are normally
distributed, we assume that es and hs 
*
 are jointly normally distributed. The specification
implies that conditional on the alternative being chosen (Lee 1983):
(17) ys = gs¢z - (ssrs) f (J (bs
¢ xs)) / F (bs
¢ xs) + xs
where  E(xs|  s is chosen) = 0, f  is the normal density function, ss is the standard
deviation of the disturbance es and rs is the correlation coefficient of es and hs
*
. The
conditional variance of  xs is:
(18)   var (xs | s is chosen) = ss
2 - (ssrs)2 [J (bs¢ x) + f (J (bs¢ x)) / F (bs¢ x) ]
* f (J (bs
¢ x)) / F (bs
¢ x).
Equation (17) can be estimated in two stages. First we estimate the logi  choice model to
obtain maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the choice between pill taking and
non-pill taking (with the EMU from the self-imposed schedule choice included as a RHS
variable). We then estimate equation (19) by OLS after substituting bj
¢
, j = 1, ..., M  into
equation (17):
(19) 
ys = gs¢z - (ssrs) f (J (bs
¢
xs)) / F (bs
¢
xs) + xs
where: 
xs = xs + ssrs [f (J (bs
¢
xs)) / F (bs
¢
xs) - f (J (bs
¢ xs)) / F (bs
¢xs) ] .
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The unobserved effects xs are heteroscedastic just as they are in the probi  specification. A
corrected asymptotic variance matrix is constructed to enable OLS estimation to
accommodate this correction.
The final empirical results, after extensive testing of hypotheses representing each generic
source of potential influence, are summarised in Tables 2 and 3 for the full sample
(excluding owner driver fleet operators), and in Table 4 for the trip-specific models for the
sub-sample of drivers reporting freight rates. Table 5, in the appendix, gives the mean and
standard deviation of variables used in the models.
4. An Assessment of the Annual Economic Reward
Model System
The total number of working hours per annum is the most important truck driver
determined factor in establishing the opportunity for economic reward. Hours committed
to the job have a significant influence on the amount of driving time obtained which in turn
directly contributes to explaining variations in average weekly earnings net of truck
expenses. Nine exogenous effects were identified as influences on the variations in total
working hours across the sample of 791 truck drivers. All are statistically significant and
with plausible signs. Hours of work are higher for independent owner drivers, sub-
contractors and small company drivers compared to prime contractors and medium/large
company drivers. We found a strong synergy between independent owner drivers and
employee drivers in small companies (less than 6 employees).
Drivers who take pills either some of the time or on all trips tend to work longer hours, as
do truckies who have higher annual truck repayments and those who have rejected loads in
the past year for whatever reason. Compensating factors which act to reduce work hours
are the aging of a truck driver and the inclusion of backload provisions where regular
contracts are in place. Three additional variables condition the influence of background,
lifestyle, sub-industry status and financial pressure on performance. These are the state in
which a driver is based and the incidence of trips between Melbourne and Brisbane. West
Australian based drivers tend to work longer hours, all other things being equal, for fairly
obvious reasons: they usually have long hauls coast to coast. On the contrary, NSW based
drivers tend, relative to drivers based in other states, to work shorter hours. The spatial
variables provide an important contextual qualification, highlighting the comparative
advantage of NSW based drivers in respect of work hours.
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However when one considers the link between working hours and the proportion of such
hours which are behind the wheel (directly productive hours if carrying a load) one finds
that longer working hours do not lead to a higher percentage of driving time. It does
however lead to a higher absolute amount of driving time. This is an important finding
because it suggests that in order to improve one’s chances of having more wheelhours n
has to invest in a more than proportionally higher amount of non-driving time. This is the
phenomenon of diseconomies of work time. This is what tends to produce the lifestyle
characteristics associated with pills, lack of sleep, self-imposed schedules and bad diet.
Three exogenous variables also contribute to the explanation of the variability in the
incidence of wheelhours. Truck drivers with a higher complement of Sydney-Brisbane trips
(SBTRIPS), and/or are employee drivers paid per trip (TRIPPY) and/or have regular
contracts (RCALL) for all trips tend, other things being equal, to have a higher percentage
of work time behind the wheel. This is an intuitively plausible finding. It particularly
highlights the important role that regular contracts have in minimising the amount of
unproductive or marginally productive non-driving time.
Through the influence of total work hours on the incidence of driving time, there is strong
evidence to support the hypothesis that the greater the proportion of work time behind the
wheel, the greater the economic rewards, after allowing for a number of contextual,
background, lifestyle and other influences. The regular contract (RCALL) features in the
direct sources of influence on weekly earnings. Truck drivers with no regular contracts tend
to commit themselves to long periods of waiting to secure the next load. All other things
being equal, there is a strong negative and increasingly negative impact on earnings from
increasing amounts of waiting time (NXT..). The most noticeable reduction in earnings
occurs when waiting exceeds 24 hours (NXTGT24).
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Table 2 Determinants of the annual economic reward profile
Estimation method: Three Stage Least Squares (791 observations)
Explanatory Variables Acronym Parameter t-value
estimate
Equation 1: Log(Av. weekly earnings net of truck expenses) LINCPWKN
Log(% time driving) LDRVHRS 0.7860 2.60
Where no regular contract:
Wait up to 12 hrs for next load (1,0) NXTL12 -.2180 -2.80
Wait 12-24 hrs for next load (1,0) NXT1224 -.2397 -2.71
Wait > 24 hrs for next load (1,0) NXTGT24 -.4377 -4.20
OD years of outstanding loan repayments OUTLOAN -.1509 -7.55
Constant 3.1814   2.54
OLS r-squared 0.16
Equation 2: Log(Incidence of driving time in total work hours) LDRVHRS
Log(total work hours) LWORKHRS -.0878 -1.65
No. of Sydney-Brisbane trips SBTRIPS 0.0067  3.14
Employee driver paid per trip (1,0) TRIPPY 0.0748  3.98
All trips with a regular contract (1,0) RCALL 0.0704  3.29
Constant 4.4772 15.16
OLS r-squared 0.10
Equation 3: Log(Total work hours) LWORKHRS
Age of driver AGE -0.0067 -5.98
Indep. OD & small co. driver (1,0) ODINSC 0.0709  3.16
West Australia based (1,0) WAB 0.1162  2.56
New South Wales based (1,0) NSWB -.1548 -7.07
No. of Melbourne-Brisbane trips MBTRIPS 0.0096  2.56
Pill taking on some or every trip (1,0) PILLS 0.0681  3.35
Log(annual truck repayments) LREPAYC 0.0025  1.20
Backload provision for regular contracts (1,0) BACKLOAD -.0472 -2.30
Tendency to reject loads (1,0) REJLOAD 0.0418  1.98
Constant 4.815 98.8
OLS r-squared 0.23
Equation 4: Number of speeding fines in last 12 months FINES
Log(total work hours) LWORKHRS 3.9284  3.82
Pill taking on every trip (1,0) AWAKE4 1.9051  3.43
Reject loads due to badpayers (1,0) BADPAY 1.6403  1.70
No. of Sydney-Melbourne trips SMTRIPS 0.0750  3.64
No. of annual sickdays SICKDAYS 0.0174  2.10
Constant -16.88 -3.58
OLS r-squared 0.20
Equation 5: Number of log book fines in last 12 months FINEL
Log(total work hours) LWORKHRS 3.0841  3.74
Pill taking on every trip (1,0) AWAKE4 1.3075  2.91
Reject loads due to badpayers (1,0) BADPAY 3.1308  4.01
No. of annual sickdays SICKDAYS 0.0232  3.45
Constant -13.274 -3.51
OLS r-squared 0.17
The financial burden of continuing loan commitments (OUTLOAN) has the expected
negative impact on earnings. Owner drivers with a greater number of years of outstanding
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loan repayments tend to have lower earnings. This might be expected because of the
correlation between the number of years of a loan (even allowing for the fact that loans
were taken out at different periods prior to the survey period) and the actual repayments,
which suggests that all other thing being equal that drivers with longer repayment periods
increasingly are unable to keep net earnings up to a level equivalent to those with shorter
or no repayment periods.
Two additional equations were linked into the earnings system to establish the existence of
possible sources of influence on the number of speeding (FINES) and log book (FINEL)
fines. As might be expected the incidence of fines is conditioned by the total amount of
wheelhours which are in absolute terms positively correlated with working hours. The
incidence of fines is statistically significant on the Sydney-Melbourne route (SMTRIPS)
where both the quality of the Hume Highway and the apparently greater police surveillance
contribute to explain this situation. Three other factors contribute to the higher amount of
annual fines; the consumption of pills (PILLS), experience with bad payments (BADPAY)
which has resulted in subsequent rejection of loads and the number of days off work due to
sickness (SICKDAYS).
The full model system provides clear evidence to support arguments which suggest that an
improvement in earnings may be achieved in an environment of regular contracts (or at least
the amount of work time committed to achieving an acceptable earnings stream can be
reduced by regular contracts), which flows through to a lesser dependence on pills and loss
of business. It does not follow with certainty that a widespread introduction of regular
contracts would result in an increase in earnings for all operators. Rather, this will depend
on the extent of bidding for contracts which could result in a reduction in rates. The
compensating benefit however is the significant reduction in unproductive working hours
and the concomitant flow through to improved performance on the road.
5. An Assessment of the Trip Specific Activity Profile
The trip-specific model system results are summarised in Tables 3a and 3b. We begin with
the bivariate probit model where we evaluate the extent to which the propensity to take
pills and the self-imposition of a schedule jointly influence on-road speed (Table 3a).
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Table 3a Determinants of the propensity to speed (total average speed) Estimation
method I: FIML bivariate probit and selectivity regression
(760 observations)
Explanatory Variables Acronym Parameter t-value
estimate
Equation 1: Joint determination of propensity to take pills on some or every trip and the
propensity to self-impose schedules
(i) Propensity to self-impose schedules (ARRB)
Age of driver AGE -.091 -1.71
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedules (1,0) SCHARR 0.4204  4.26
Independent owner driver (1,0) ODIOD 0.2365  1.89
No. of stops - sleep + rest activities SLPREST -.2031 -2.89
Average ratio drive/total time per trip leg MEANPERC 0.0102  2.48
Constant -.1876 -.580
(ii) Propensity to take pills on some or every trip (PILLS)
Age of driver AGE -.0248 -4.18
Driver has always been a truckie (1,0) NOPRVOCC 0.3851  3.30
Hours on road in prior 8 hours ROAD8 0.0471  1.60
Hours sleeping in prior 8 hours SLEEP8 -.0634 -3.75
Gross weight of truck TRKWT 0.0402  3.16
Load is perishable cargo (1,0) GDPER 0.3810  3.39
No. of speeding fines per annum FINES 0.0850  3.98
Owner driver paid per load (1,0) PAYTYPL -.1902 -1.51
All trips with a regular contract (1,0) RCALL -.2564 -2.39
Constant 0.0731  0.23
Rho (ARRB,PILLS) .0309 0.492
Log-likelihood -956.25
Equation 2: Log (Average speed per trip) LTOTASP
Pill taking behaviour (1,0) PILLS 0.0815  2.19
Sydney-Brisbane trip (1,0) SYBR -.0390 -2.11
Sydney-Melbourne trip (1,0) SYML 0.0479  3.10
Age of driver AGE -.0022 -2.78
No. of no-sleep stops NOSLEEP 0.0106  2.79
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedules (1,0) SCHARR 0.0188  1.50
Percent of trip time 6pm to 6am EVEPERC 0.0004  1.60
Weekend trip (1,0) DAYSTRT 0.0379  2.71
Rigid truck (1,0) TRKRIG -.1754 -4.58
Log(average ratio drive/total time per trip leg) LMEANPRC 0.0971 3.33
Lambda (ARRB) - Selectivity 0.0024  0.31
Lambda (PILLS) - Selectivity -.3180  -1.40
Constant 3.9687 34.27
Estimated correlation with selection equation ARRB 0.021
Estimated correlation with selection equation PILLS -.194
Estimated disturbance standard deviation 0.164
r-squared 0.20
Equation 3: Log (Standard deviation of speed across legs) LSPEEDSD
Pill taking behaviour (1,0) PILLS 0.1170 0.80
Sydney-Brisbane trip (1,0) SYBR 0.1300  1.49
No. of no-sleep stops NOSLEEP 0.1732 10.03
Trip started before 8 am (1,0) TSTL8 -.3291 -3.76
Standard deviation of each leg's drive/total time ratioRATIOSD 2.1511  7.85
Lambda (ARRB) - Selectivity 0.0151  0.41
Lambda (PILLS) - Selectivity 0.0507  -.53
Constant 1.4588 12.53
Estimated correlation with selection equation ARRB0.021
Estimated correlation with selection equation PILLS-.065
Estimated disturbance standard deviation 0.7900
r-squared 0.23
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The correlation between the unobserved influences on the probability of pill taking and the
self-imposition of schedules is 0.0309. Using the Lagrange multiplier test (LM) under the
null hypothesis that r o equals zero (the equivalence of two independent probit equations),
the LM statistic value of 3.221 suggests that the hypothesis that rho equals zero cannot be
rejected. Thus we would conclude that the bivariate probit specification behaves as if the
two choices were independent.
The selectivity terms (Lambda’s) in the average speed equation lead us to reject any
statistical bias due to the inclusion/exclusion of drivers in each category of the self-imposed
schedule treatments (ARRB); however this is not so with respect to pill taking although the
confidence level is only 93%. Lambda contains information on the variances of the
unobserved components of the probit equation and the selectivity regression equation as
well as the correlation between them (Equations 10 and 11). The estimated correlation
between the average speed equation and the pill taking equation is - 0.19 and its correlation
with the self-imposed schedule equation is 0.021. This evidence suggests that if the self-
imposed schedule is to influence average speed, it is unlikely to do so via its joint influence
with the propensity to take pills. The possibility of other linkages is evaluated using a
nested logit framework under the alternative hypothesis that on-road speed is influenced by
pill taking which is itself influenced by self-imposed schedules (Table 3b).
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Table 3b Determinants of the propensity to speed (total average speed)
Estimation method II: sequential nested logit and selectivity
regression (760 observations)
Explanatory Variables Acronym Parameter t-value
estimate
Equation 1: Propensity to self-impose schedules (ARRB)
Age of driver AGE -.0149 -1.76
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedules (1,0) SCHARR 0.6871  4.28
Independent owner driver (1,0) ODIOD 0.3954  1.91
No. of stops: sleep + rest activities SLPREST -.3366 -2.64
Average ratio drive/total time per trip leg MEANPERC 0.0167  2.50
Constant -.3114  -.60
Log-likelihood -497.62
Equation 2: Propensity to take pills on some or every trip (PILLS)
Age of driver AGE -.0336 -3.40
Driver has always been a truckie (1,0) NOPRVOCC 0.6302  3.32
Hours on road in prior 8 hours ROAD8 0.0667  1.28
Hours sleeping in prior 8 hours SLEEP8 -.1022 -3.67
Gross weight of truck TRKWT 0.0699  2.66
Load is perishable cargo (1,0) GDPER 0.5547  2.91
No. of speeding fines per annum FINES 0.1355  3.45
Owner driver paid per load (1,0) PAYTYPL -.3815 -1.78
All trips with a regular contract (1,0) RCALL -.3798 -2.13
Expected maximum utility : ARRB EMU 0.4641  2.57
Constant -.3239 -0.55
Log-likelihood -455.94
Equation 3: Log (Average speed per trip) LTOTASP
Pill taking behaviour (1,0) PILLS 0.0714 1.95
Sydney-Brisbane trip (1,0) SYBR -.0304 -2.14
Sydney-Melbourne trip (1,0) SYML 0.0472  3.06
Age of driver AGE -.0024 -3.10
No. of no-sleep stops NOSLEEP 0.0106  2.78
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedules (1,0) SCHARR 0.0167  1.40
Percent of trip time 6pm-6am EVEPERC 0.0004  1.75
Weekend trip (1,0) DAYSTRT 0.0381  2.73
Rigid truck (1,0) TRKRIG -.1779 -4.68
Log(average ratio drive/total time per trip leg) LMEANPRC 0.0951 3.23
Lambda (PILLS) - Selectivity 0-.0246  -1.0
Constant 3.9863 35.09
Correlation: rho and disturbance -.151
Standard error corrected for selection 0.163
r-squared 0.20
Equation 4: Log (Standard deviation of speed across legs) LSPEEDSD
Pill taking behaviour PILLS 0.0733   0.52
Sydney-Brisbane trip (1,0) SYBR 0.1286   1.50
No. of no-sleep stops NOSLEEP 0.1725 10.03
Trip started before 8 am (1,0) TSTL8 -.3354 -3.82
Standard deviation of each leg's drive/total time ratioRATIOSD 2.1492  7.86
Lambda (PILLS) - Selectivity 0.0180  0.19
Constant 1.4826 13.02
Correlation: rho and disturbance -.0228
Standard error corrected for selection 0.788
r-squared 0.23
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The selectivity regression for the standard deviation of leg speeds (SPEEDSD) was not able
to establish a statistically significant link between itself and the two selection equations with
respective correlations of 0.021 (ARRB) and -0.065 (PILLS). Given the statistical non-
significance of the pill taking endogenous dummy variable we are led to conclude that pill
taking behaviour does not influence the variations in average speed between legs of a trip.
However, the statistical significance of PILLS in the average speed equation (t-value =
2.19) provides statistically strong evidence to support the hypothesis that after accounting
for possible selectivity, the propensity to take pills either on all trips or some trips does
have a significant positive influence on trip speed. This important finding reinforces the
evidence reported in He sher and Battellino (1990). The self-imposed schedule dummy
variable was statistically non-significant in both selectivity regression equations (with t-
values less that 0.08).
The nested logit framework provides a statistically stronger relationship between pill taking,
self-imposed schedules and speed. The expected maximum utility index linking the
probability of self-imposed schedules and pill taking is statistically significant (t-value =
2.57) and of the correct sign for a nested structure consistent with the notion of random
utility maximisation. A necessary and sufficient condition for consistency with utility
maximisation is that the parameter of EMU is contained within the range 0.0 to 1.0. An
estimated value of 0.46 indicates that there is a sequential recursive relationship between
pill taking and self-imposed schedules. The probability of participating in pill taking is
amongst other reasons influenced by the expected maximum utility emanating from the
choice process associated with self-imposed schedule selection. After allowing for any
possible selectivity in respect of pill taking in the population of long distance truck drivers,
the evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between pill taking and trip speed. On average, drivers on pills tend, ceteris
paribus, to drive at speeds 10 kph greater than drivers not on pills. This is typically a
comparison of 90 vs 100 kph and 100 vs 110 kph.
Given the hierarchical linkages now established between speed, drugs and self-imposed
schedules, we can interpret the findings on other factors influencing all three endogenous
variables. Five exogenous variables had a statistically significant influence on the probability
of a driver imposing a schedule. This self-imposition is more likely for younger (and
because of its correlation) less experienced drivers. It is reinforced by (or may arise from)
the imposition of a schedule from an employer or freight forwarder. Thirty-seven percent of
the sample had such a constraint. Independent owner drivers representing 17.4% of the
sample have a significantly higher propensity to self-impose schedules than do employee
drivers, prime contractors and subcontractors. The analysis also suggests that drivers who
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tend to have a greater number of trip stops involving some component of sleep and rest
(after allowing for the incidence of drive time in total trip time - MEANPERC, which is a
highly correlated proxy for trip length) tend to have a lower probability of self-imposing
schedules. This arises most plausibly because of the lesser amount of pressure on the
driver’s earning opportunity.
The factors influencing the probability that a driver will take pills are quite extensive. We
consistently found that 9 exogenous variables explained the pill taking propensity within the
sampled population. Forty-six per cent of the sample take pills either all the time or on
some trips. Four variables have a negative relationship with the probability of taking pills:
the age of the driver, the availability of regular contracts for this trip and all other trips, the
opportunity for an owner driver to be paid on a per load basis (in comparison with payment
per tonne or per kilometre for owner drivers and either by fixed salary, a percent of truck
earnings or on a per trip basis for employee drivers), and the incidence of sleep in the 8
hours prior to trip commencement. The variables that have a positive influence on drug
taking are drivers with no previous occupation (who have always been a truckie), hours on
the road in the last 8 hours prior to commencing the current trip, the gross weight of the
truck (proxying for the size and prestige of vehicles and in many cases debt on the truck),
those drivers carrying perishables, and those drivers who tend to have the higher incidence
of speeding fines.
These positive and negative influences when taken together are expressing a “lifestyle”
phenomenon which in part is the historical product of pressures in the market to secure
loads in order to earn an acceptable wage. Any assistance to this industry which can reduce
the pressures in the market to a level which will reduce the reliance on pills must be
desirable (even after allowing for the possibility of somewhat higher rates for moving
goods). The important point is that the current rates have not internalised the negative
externalities rampant in this industry, which have spawned a lifestyle encouraging pill taking
in order to stay awake long enough to improve the financial situation. The use of stimulants
is as widespread in the employee driver sector as it is in the owner driver sector, and is
regarded by many drivers as an acceptable practice.
Two empirical measures of speed were used to capture the exposure to risk element of on-
road performance. The first is the average speed across all legs (TOTASP), the second is
the standard deviation of leg speeds (SPEEDSD). Extensive checking of the data was
undertaken to ensure that the reported details on each leg’s distance and time (including
stop time) were reasonable. Comparisons between drivers on legs between the same
locations provided an additional method of checking the reliability of implied speeds. This
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enabled us to ensure that the distances were accurate and highlighted any substantial
discrepancy due to an unreliable reported travel time.
The set of trip-specific models yield intuitively plausible findings.
(i) Trip routes and speeding
Ceteris paribus, there is a tendency for drivers on the Sydney-Brisbane route (primarily the
Pacific Highway) to have lower average speeds than drivers on other routes. Likewise trips
between Sydney and Melbourne (primarily along the Hume Highway) tend to have average
speeds higher than the sample average. The first evidence supports the concern to slow
down due to the poor condition of the road whereas the higher speeds on the Hume are
indicative of the better quality road. Therefore, there is evidence here of the general
sensitivity of truck drivers to the quality of the roads. We should also remind ourselves of
the evidence that trips along the Hume Highway tend to have a higher incidence of
speeding fines.
(ii) Night time driving and speeding
A particularly important finding is that trips with a higher percentage of night-time driving
(EVEPERC) are associated with higher average speeds. If this were the only factor
influencing the temporal allocation of truck trips, then one may make a case for
encouraging more daylight hours of travel. However this has a downside, in that there
would be more trucks on the road during hours when more passenger vehicles are on the
road. The larger non-rigid trucks tend to have higher speeds than rigid trucks. On average
the rigid trucks travel 12 kph slower than the articulated vehicles. It is true however that
the trip lengths are shorter for the rigid vehicles.
(iii) Trip length and speeding
Throughout the study we have noticed a consistent positive correlation between on-road
performance and trip length. The strong positive relationship between MEANPERC and
average speed (with an elasticity of 0.10) and between RATIOSD and the standard
deviation of average leg speed reinforces this point. The option of mandated longer stops
(say up to 12 hours) for trips over 500 kilometres is worthy of consideration from an
immediate safety perspective. It may have undesirable financial implications because of the
likely requirement for a second driver.
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(iv) No sleep stops and speeding
Ceteris paribus, drivers with fewer no-sleep stops en route tend to have higher average
speeds. This is also linked to the propensity to take pills and the imposition of schedules on
37% of trips by freight forwarders.
There is also a strong negative relationship between age of driver and average speed, as
expected. All of these findings give confidence in the quality of the data - the evidence is
intuitively plausible. Most of these influencing variables individuallyaffect the average
speed 5 kph above or below the average. Thus when combined, there are some substantial
variations in average speeds attributable to sets of positive effects as well as sets of negative
effects.
(v) Rates, payment method and speeding
The role of freight rates (or earnings for owner drivers) on trip speed has been incorporated
in the trip-specific models for the sub-sample of 410 trips with complete information on
rates. We report only the findings for the nested-logit mo el structure in Table 4. There is
very strong evidence to support the primary hypothesis that the trip rate received by the
owner driver (i.e. gross earnings) and the freight rate obtained by the company using an
employee driver have a significant influence on the propensity to speed. The negative
relationship is stronger for owner drivers as might be expected. The relationship with the
standard deviation of leg speeds is not statistically significant.
The major impetus of this study has been confirmed: on-road performance is strongly linked
to economic reward. An obvious proposition in many ways, but a proposition that has not
been previously established in a scientific manner, nor a proposition which has previously
been confirmed in the context of allowing for other direct and indirect influences on
performance.
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Table 4 Linking freight rates to on-road performance
Estimation method II: sequential nested logit and selectivity regression (410
observations)
Explanatory Variables Acronym Parameter t-value
estimate
Equation 1: Propensity to self-impose schedules (ARRB)
Age of driver AGE -.0186 -1.64
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedules (1,0) SCHARR 0.3077  1.60
Independent owner driver (1,0) ODIOD 0.2675  1.40
No. of stops:  sleep + rest activities SLPREST -.5210 -3.12
Average ratio drive/total time per trip leg MEANPERC 0.0060  0.64
Constant 0.7696  1.03
Log-likelihood -265.22
Equation 2: Propensity to take pills on some or every trip (PILLS)
Age of driver AGE -.0332 -2.48
Driver has always been a truckie (1,0) NOPRVOCC 0.5310  1.99
Hours on road in prior 8 hours ROAD8 0.1481  1.85
Hours sleeping in prior 8 hours SLEEP8 -.0796 -2.12
Gross weight of truck TRKWT 0.0542  1.40
Load is perishable cargo (1,0) GDPER 0.3972  1.53
No. of speeding fines per annum FINES 0.1131  2.24
Owner driver paid per load (1,0) PAYTYPL -.5969 -2.52
All trips with a regular contract (1,0) RCALL -.4034 -1.55
Expected maximum utility : ARRB EMU 0.4556  2.00
Constant 0.0927  0.11
Log-likelihood -248.86
Equation 3: Log (Average Speed per Trip) LTOTASP
Pill taking behaviour (1,0) PILLS 0.0743 -1.60
Sydney-Brisbane trip (1,0) SYBR -.0587 -2.75
Sydney-Melbourne trip (1,0) SYML 0.0285  1.50
Age of driver AGE -.0029 -3.09
No. of no-sleep stops NOSLEEP 0.0019  0.42
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedules (1,0) SCHARR 0.0395  2.50
Percent trip 6pm to 6am EVEPERC 0.0068  2.00
Weekend trip (1,0) DAYSTRT 0.0483  2.73
Rigid truck (1,0) TRKRIG -.1014 -1.94
Log(average ratio drive/total time per trip leg) LMEANPRC 0.0778 1.94
Freight rate for owner drivers (c/km) DKMOD -.00087 -6.13
Freight rate for employer (c/km) DKMED -.00051 -4.00
Lambda (PILLS) - Selectivity 0.0554  1.72
Constant 4.2430 27.20
Correlation: rho and disturbance 0.370
Standard error corrected for selection 0.149
r-squared 0.22
Equation 4: Log (Standard deviation of speed across legs) LSPEEDSD
Pill taking behaviour PILLS 0.1987 1.04
Sydney-Brisbane trip (1,0) SYBR 0.0566  0.58
No. of no-sleep stops NOSLEEP 0.1148  5.68
Trip started before 8 am (1,0) TSTL8 -.3046 -2.51
Standard deviation of each leg's drive/total time ratioRATIOSD 1.3555  3.52
Freight rate for owner drivers (c/km) DKMOD -.00071 -1.08
Freight rate for employer (c/km) DKMED -.00081 -1.37
Lambda (PILLS) - Selectivity 0.06551  -.53
Constant 1.9562 11.19
Correlation: rho and disturbance -.092
Standard error corrected for selection 0.708
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r-squared 0.15
6. Conclusion
The influences on the performance of long distance truck drivers in Australia are related in
a complex way. Although the centrepiece of a causal system is the linkage between
potential earnings, lifestyle and pressures imposed on a driver by employers and the
marketplace, there are some very explicit influences impinging on safe practices on the road
where safety and exposure to risk are adequately represented by variations in average trip
speed across the population of truck drivers.
The data obtained from 800 truck drivers are used herein to establish a first round
understanding of some of the major endogenous linkages and exogenous determinants on
safe practice in respect of a particular trip and its links with the macro environment for
annual earnings. This has enabled us to scientifically investigate a large number of the
anecdotes and qualitative “evidence” previously used to develop positions in respect of
strategies to “rid the industry and the road environment of cowboys”.
Economic rewards to both owner drivers and employers of drivers have a major influence
on the propensity to speed; but that in particular:
(i) it is the rate per se which acts to stimulate road practices in various forms in order to
ensure that an acceptable level of total earnings (net of truck-related expenses) is
obtained. Any deviation from a fixed salary tends to encourage practices designed to
increase economic reward which are not synergetic with reducing exposure to risk.
(ii) the uncertainty of annual earnings encourages the practice of self-imposed schedules
and the taking of stimulants to enable extension of the productive working week. While
the extended working week does increase the earnings, the incidence of productive (i.e.
driving) time decreases as total working hours increases. Any strategy which can
reduce the uncertainty of earnings must reduce the hours of total work, increase the
amount of sleep time and consequently reduce the incidence of self-imposed schedules
and hence the use of stimulants.
Regular contracts may be a preferred form of load allocation, initially obtained by a process
of competitive bidding, with possibly relatively short contracts in order to ensure that bid
prices remain competitive. This may be the only way to minimise the amount of
unproductive waiting time and to eventually prune the industry. Major implementation of
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competitive bidding in other transport industries is seen as a preferred alternative to
complete economic deregulation primarily because of the inability of deregulation to
manifest an acceptable program of internalising the negative externalities of unfettered
competition.
Loan repayments on a truck are a major financial commitment of owner drivers. Thus
strategies to ensure that the financing of trucks is achieved with least burden would
improve the net earnings of the owner driver sector.
The anecdotal evidence which tends to lay the blame for bad on-road behavi ur on owner
drivers is fallacious. Small company employee drivers have some of the worst industry
practices in respect of speeding, use of stimulants and incidence of fines. Indeed many of
the influences on variations in on-road performance, pill taking and self-imposition of
schedules which often lead to speeding are not correlated with whether a driver is an owner
driver or an employee driver. The distinction between owner driver and employee driver is
somewhat arbitrary and misleading in the current context. A much more useful classification
is in terms of the nature of contracts.
Lifestyle factors appear to have evolved as a result of the ease of entry to the industry
coupled with its highly competitive nature which demands non-routine and unpredictable
work practices for a significant number of drivers in the industry. There appears to be a
case for much more stringent safety regulations centred on the health of the driver as
distinct from the “health of the rig”. There is a great temptation for commentators to argue
that if someone wants to enter this industry, get burdened with high debts and work
excessive hours to “make a quid” then they should be allowed to. This may be acceptable
wisdom if safety of human resources at large were not at risk. It is precisely because of the
negative externalities aligned to safety that changes are required in the competitive practices
in the industry. The transactions costs are sufficiently high to warrant some restrictions on
competitive practices n the market. Competition for the market should be given serious
consideration.
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Appendix
Table 5 Mean and standard deviation of variables used in the models
DESCRIPTION ACRONYM MEAN STD DEV
Age of driver AGE 37.50 8.99
Self-imposed arrival time (1,0) TS ARRB .58
Pill taking every trip (1,0) AWAKE4 .09
Backload provision for regular contracts (1,0) BACKLOAD .39
Reject loads due to bad payers (1,0) BADPAY .03
Weekend start to trip (1,0) TS DAYSTRT .24
Percent of time spent driving DRVHRS 64.75 15.97
Percent of trip time 6pm to 6am TS EVEPERC * 59.92 26.23
No. of log book fines per annum FINEL 1.25 3.54
No. of speeding fines per annum FINES 1.80 4.34
Load is perishable cargo (1,0) TS GDPER .24
No. of Melbourne - Brisbane trips MBTRIPS .65 1.45
Av. ratio drive/total time per trip leg TS MEANPERC * 57.71 11.64
Driver has always been a truckie (1,0) NOPRVOCC .25
No. of no sleep stops TS NOSLEEP 2.30 1.73
Where no regular contract:
Wait up to 12 hours for next load (1,0) NXTL12 * .09
Wait 12-24 hours for next load (1,0) NXT1224 * .07
Wait > 24 hours for next load (1,0) NXTG24 * .05
New South Wales based (1,0) NSWB .34
Independent owner driver (1,0) ODIOD .17
Independent OD and small co. driver (1,0) ODINSC .42
Owner driver paid by load (1,0) TS PAYTPL * .51
Pill taking on some or every trip (1,0) PILLS .46
Std dev of each leg's drive/total time ratio TS RATIOSD * .29 .09
All trips with a regular contract (1,0) RCALL .32
Tendency to reject loads (1,0) REJLOAD .41
Annual truck repayments ($‘000s) REPAYC * 26.35 17.29
Hours on road in 8 hours prior to trip TS ROAD8 .79 1.62
No. of Sydney - Brisbane trips SBTRIPS 1.02 2.25
Co. or freight forwarder imposed schedule (1,0)TS SCHARR .36
No. of annual sick days SICKDAYS 6.10 18.60
Hours sleeping in 8 hours prior to trip TS SLEEP8 2.55 3.06
No. of stops - sleep + rest activities TS SLPREST .30 .63
No. of Sydney - Melbourne trips SMTRIPS 2.04 3.06
Standard deviation of trip leg speed TS SPEEDSD * 16.7 9.87
Sydney to Brisbane trip (1,0) TS SYBR .05
Sydney to Melbourne trip (1,0) TS SYML .03
Total average speed on sampled trip TOTASP * 81.06 12.60
Employee driver paid per trip (1,0) TRIPPY * .64
Gross weight of truck TRKWT 17.05 3.83
Rigid truck (1,0) TRKRIG .03
Trip started before 8am (1,0) TS TSTL8 .13
West Australia based (1,0) WAB .05
Total weekly work hours WORKHRS 105.11 29.85
Note: Standard deviation is missing for variables coded as (1,0).
* indicates not full sample of 820 trips.
TS = variable is specific to the sampled trip.
Hensher, Battellino and Daniels Long Distance Trucking
Institute of Transport Studies 30
Descriptive Background of Survey Sample
Some of the main findings from the descriptive analysis are summarised below.
Driver characteristics
• the majority of truck drivers (70%) had over 10 years experience driving large trucks on a regular basis
• the average number of annual vehicle kilometres driven by drivers in the sample was around 200,000
kms
• the majority of drivers (75%) were in the age group 25 to 44 years
• 25% of drivers had no previous occupation other than truck driving. For the others a range of
occupations was represented, primarily the trades, farmers and general labourers, but also a significant
number of managerial and professional positions
Income / payment
• the survey highlited the low level of income earned by drivers, particularly owner drivers (36% earned
less than $15,000 in 1989-90)
• the majority of employee drivers (79%) were paid directly in relation to the earnings of the truck
Work environment
• drivers believed that they worked an average of 105 hours per week. This included all work activities
both on and off the road. Of this, about 65% on average was estimated to be driving time
• a considerable amount of time is spent by drivers in off-road work activities before embarking on the
trip. Approximately 3.5 hours were spent on work related activities, such as unloading from a previous
trip, loading for the next trip and maintenance of the truck, before beginning to drive
• approximately 35% of all drivers were trav lling to a set schedule for the sampled trip
• but 60% of drivers maintained that even if they were not set a schedule by the freight forwarder they
were aiming for their own self-imposed time of arrival. This was dictated primarily by concerns to be
first in the queue to be unloaded and then to obtain the next load
Behaviour / on-road performance
• drivers from small companies recorded the highest average trip speed for the sampled trip (82.01 kph
compared with the average for the sample of 81.06 kph)
• a higher average trip speed for the sampled trip was found on the longer trips
• the younger, less experienced drivers recorded the highest average trip speed on the sampled trip (those
driving for less than 5 years had an average speed of 82.14 kph and those aged 17-24 years of age had
an average speed of 84.72 kph compared with a sample average of 81.06 kph)
• 46% of drivers admitted to taking stimulant drugs at least on some trips
• 17% of drivers had been involved in a crash in the 2 years preceding the surv y. Owner drivers and
small company drivers were more likely to have been involved in more crashes than the other types of
driver
Truck
• 40% of trucks were less than 3 years old. Owner drivers were more likely to have older trucks than any
of the other types of driver
• the high cost of the commitment of financing the truck was highlighted by the low level of deposit of
most owner drivers and the short period of the loan. The average loan period was 4.25 years and average
monthly repayments were around $2,500
• repayments on the truck were the second highest component (after fuel) of total expenses for owner
drivers
• at the time of the survey (September - October 1990) 13% of drivers were driving trucks which were
fitted with a speed limiter. This varied greatly by type of driver with 42% of large company trucks being
speed limited
• 19% of drivers were driving trucks which had a tac ogr ph fitted
Driver comments
• the main issues confronting the industry mentioned by drivers were the low level of freight rat s relative
to their operating costs and the high cost of fuel and taxes
Hensher, Battellino and Daniels Long Distance Trucking
Institute of Transport Studies 31
• the most important factors which drivers considered contributed to crashes involving heavy vehicles
were the condition of the roads, the behaviour of other vehicle drivers, fatigue on the part of the truck
driver and lack of driving skills by the truck driver
• drivers were very supportive of the need for sp cialised driver training courses to upgrade the skills of
truck drivers and to improve their image with the general public. 80% of drivers were in favour of
introducing driver training courses
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